A real world application of secure multi-party computations

Duplicate bridge for cheapskates

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Outline

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Example deal

1st permutation

Order the suits: Clubs Hearts Spades Diamonds

1143	2323	4422	1143	2411	4143
1332	4344	1223	2433	1211	3242
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2nd permutation

3231	1224	1243	4421	1233	4421
1311	1432	3332	2441	2244	3332
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♠ 82
♥ A3
♦ AQ985
♣ Q854

♠ KT95
♥ KJ9
♦ 432
♣ KJ6

♠ A43
♥ T86
♦ J76
♣ 9732

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Multi-party protocols

Traditionally

- Secret inputs to each party generating a shared result
- Computations done on computer

For duplimating

- Secret result, known inputs
- ‘Computations’ done by humans
- Intermediate state can be secret

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Attacker model

- Assume the players are inherently trustworthy
  - They can cheat anyway if not
  - Most players are trustworthy
- Players are sufficiently intelligent to make use of small amounts of information
- Main security goals:
  - Ensure neither dealer can deduce much about the hands while dealing. . .
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Protocol specifics

1. Generate random P_T; $T = \{S\}_{E_{P_T}}$
2. Discard P_T
3. Generate random P_1 and P_I
4. Calculate P_2 s.t. $T = \{\{S_{P_I}\}_{E_{P_1}}\}_{E_{P_2}}$
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Flaws and corrections I

Suit of the first card dealt

- Last thirteen cards in P_1 same suit.
- Likely that there will be a 1 in the last 13 numbers of P_1.
- Implies first card of P_2 is that suit.
- First hand dealt in P_2 does not have a void in that suit.

Solution

Randomize the order of the suits in P_1.

But...

Hands must be shuffled before going into the boards, else the second dealer can infer the suit order from the order of the cards in their hands.

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- Two trials, 3 sessions in November–December 2007, 6 sessions in January–March 2008.
- Approximately six dealers in total, three pairs.
- Time to deal 28 boards consistently 10–15 minutes.
- Observed error rate 4–6 boards, with one perfect result.

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- More rigorous trials
- Montecarlo simulations
- Alternative primitives

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Trial error results

Session	Failures	Recoverable Errors
14/03/08	1	3
07/03/08	2	3
22/02/08	0	0
15/02/08	2	2
07/02/08	3	4
31/02/08	4	2
30/11/07	5	2
16/11/07	7	1
01/11/07	4	1

Table: Errors in each session